Nationalist East

Liberals often have the tendency to focus on details that reinforce their vision of a brighter tomorrow. In Finland, the media was quick to highlight that the predicted rise of the far-right did not happen, and therewith the European Union succeeded to avoid once again this mounting threat. The number of MEPs obtained by the party groups of the European Parliament is demonstrated as a proof. 

However, it can be unequivocally stated that the voter’s consumer protection has never been as weak as it was in this EU election. This is clearly visible when taking a closer look at the election results of the EU’s Eastern member states. 

Right-wing East

The parties belonging to the largest group in the European Parliament – the EPP – won the European elections in eight of the 11 Eastern member states of the EU – although in one of these, i.e. Romania, the liberals were in fact in an electoral alliance with the Democrats. The EPP gained 71 members from the East alone (out of its total of 186 members). 

These parties include Christian Democrats like Germany’s CDU and moderate conservatives, often called liberal conservatives by Eastern standards. However, all of them are united by some sort of pro-EU attitude – at least in principle. 

There are important differences, however. For example, the opposition to both the quota policy of migrants and the deepening integration of the Union are factors that separate the Eastern EPP groups from their western sister parties. 

In the East, the EU is seen as a loose union of nation states, where the primary task of MEPs is to promote the national interest.

Countries such as Poland or Czechia, which would have been euro-eligible for years due to their wealth and solid economic development, oppose the introduction of the common currency because it would reduce their nation’s right to political self-determination. 

When focusing on the winning parties alone, one should remember that the difference between the winner and the runner-up can often be reduced to one single representative and that the winning party’s ratio of all the votes can be very low. For example, while Poland’s much-hyped, pro-EU and pro-rule of law governing party won the election, EU-critical parties actually won 30 out of Poland’s 53 MEPs. 

Besides Poland, more than half of the seats went to Eurosceptic parties also in Slovakia, Latvia, Romania and Hungary.

The biggest liberal parties that won the European elections – such as the neoliberal ANO in Czechia and the liberal green Progressive Slovakia – are in opposition in their home countries. The ever-decreasing liberal party family Renew Europe only gets 28 MEPs from the East. In Hungary and Croatia, the liberals got no support at all. 

In Hungary, although the PM Party Fidesz did win the election with an over 44% of the vote, this was a slight disappointment – due to the rapid rise in popularity of a new opposition party established by an ex-Fidesz parliamentarian, which gained 30% of the vote.

The vagueness of the left flank

In Finland, the incredible success of the Left Alliance obscures the bigger picture of the European Parliament’s left flank’s electoral success.

Many of East’s 28 Social Democrat MEPs, such as the ones from Romania and Bulgaria, are not only EU-sceptics, but also nationalists and, according to Eastern jargon, ‘social conservatives’.  Slovakia’s six Social Democrats even prefer to join the group of independents rather than their own party family. 

To the left of the Democrats, i.e. in the company of the Left Alliance, there are a bunch of pro-Russian ex-communists from the East, who, hiding behind a dove of peace, oppose any lethal aid to Ukraine. 

Most worrying of all is the shabby group of independents and new parties that at least do not yet have chosen a party family. As many as 37 such MEPs are coming from the East. This is more than, for example, liberals or leftists. 

What the European Parliament will ultimately look like remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that the importance of Eastern parties will grow in all of the party families. This will increasingly affect the profile and decision-making of the European Parliament party families. 

Thus, what the national candidates promised in their campaigns about influencing the joint agenda of their party family may ultimately be far from reality.